affect the figure of the total population in the Southwest China Region, because Sikang and Szechwan provinces had been included in the 1953 census figure for this region; nevertheless, it changes the distribution according to the political subdivisions of Southwest China as follows:

Table 1. Population Distribution in Southwest China*

Kweichow Province	15,037,310
Szechwan Province	65,685,063
Yunnan Province	17,472,737
Regional Total	98,195,110

*Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, Nov. 1, 1954, p. 1; Sikang population is included in Szechwan.

Among all the regions of China, this region ranks third in population and fourth in size of area.

The accuracy of the figures in Table 1 is, of course, still open to question. Doubt may easily be cast upon these figures on the basis of one or both of the following facts: (1) The 1953 census-taking was not thorough; in certain areas where direct counting of noses was not possible, undefined "indirect" methods (possibly estimates)

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were employed. (2) Before the results of the census were announced, responsible Communist quarters had already instituted a campaign to "correct the undesirable habit of filing false reports," and even the Bureau of Statistics had begun to criticize the lack of reliability in the statistical work at various government levels.[2] Until 1952, the estimates on China's population cited by Communist officials were all under 500 million. Early in 1953, several months before the census figures were completely tabulated, estimates were stepped up to around 550 million. Thus there is ground for suspicion that the Peking government might have intentionally exaggerated the figures for propaganda purposes.[3]

However, until evidence proving fabrication is discovered, the figures in Table 1 will stand as the result of the first and hereto only direct nationwide census. Relative reliability is further strengthened by the following points: (1) They generally tally with the figures on the electorate,

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2. Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, March 31, 1954, p. 1.

3. Tsui-chin Ch'i-ko-yüeh Lai Chung-yao Fei-ch'ing Tsung-ho Pao-kao [Comprehensive Report on Important Developments in Communist China in the Last Seven Months], Taipei, the Sixth Section, Central Committee, the Nationalist Party, 1954, pp. 22-23.

delegates and their representation in the "basic-level election" for which the census was initiated.[4] (2) The fact that scattered reports on the basic-level elections are available, roughly covering all parts of China, should serve to indicate the geographic extent if not the degree of thoroughness with which the census-taking was carried out. (3) The Communists as far back as 1949 had begun their study on population, and it appears correct to say that the Peking regime had exercised considerable discretion in checking the 1953 census against the previously released figures. (4) Only a comparatively small portion of the 1953 population figures (about 8 million) was derived from the so-called "indirect method of census-taking." (5) The above cited commique also reported on the review of these figures by the Bureau of Statistics. After rechecking 9 per cent (or 52,950,000) of the total population in a cross-section of many different localities, the duplicates amounted to only 0.139 per cent and those uncounted in the initial registration only 0.255 per cent.

B. Density

From the figures in Table 1 it is apparent that Szechwan Province, the richest and only

4. Yuan-li Wu, An Economic Survey of Communist China, New York, Bookman Associates, 1956, pp. 13-22.

625 safety in the cities is more complex than in the rural areas. The Communists approach this problem from at least four different angles: (a) an extensive public security organization; (b) rigid census control over resident movements; (c) the establishment of resident organizatins to watch over the entire populace, including committees in all organizations; and (d) the strict regulation of all commercial and recreational activities.

The Public Security Bureau in a municipal government maintains eight sections and several other units. The eight sections include a secretariat, political security (including intelligence, investigation, confidential communication), security administration, police, sanitation, fire prevention, supply, and personnel. Other units under the bureau include prisons, detention houses, and "Reform-through-labor" camps as well as security-training schools and security forces. Under the bureau, ch'ü sub-bureaus and security sub-stations have been established. The organization of the sub-bureau is as elaborate as that of the bureau itself. The sub-bureau takes charge of detention houses and directs the work of security stations and security committees under them.

625 659 In 1951, the Communists began to tighten census control throughout the Southwest. The directive on census control, issued by the

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625 Government Administration Council in July
659 1951, restricted the movement of city dwellers.[23] Any resident who wished to move had first to obtain a permit from the security station. Likewise, any person who moved into the district had to report his arrival to the station. Even house guests staying three days or more were required to register. The nationwide census taken in 1953 placed urban residents under stricter vigilance. "Planned purchase and marketing," a form of rationing introduced at the end of 1953, strengthened security control. The recent institution of a regular system of registration increases the burden of established regulations.[24]

625 The Security Committee was first organized in the cities during the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement in 1951. Dwellers in a street or an alley formed a unit for the establishment of a committee. Under the security sub-station, which might have jurisdiction over several streets, security committees were linked to form

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23. Yangtze Daily, July 18, 1951, p. 4.

24. Directive of the State Council in People's Daily, July 3, 1955, p. 1; see Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], April 2, 1955, p. 1.

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As a whole, the fiscal policy of the Communist government has been more unfavorable to industry and trade than to agriculture. During the five-year period under consideration, private enterprise in industry and trade not only has had to bear a great burden of the increasing expenditure of the government, but also has been forced to accept stiff competition from government enterprises which, according to the Communist policy, will ultimately monopolize all the important trade and industries in the country. 652

On the expenditure side, military outlay constituted 41.5 per cent of total government expenditure in 1950 and 1951, respectively. After 1952, because of the truce in Korea, the relative importance of the military outlay has been substantially reduced. In 1954, it was only 21.1 per cent of the year's total expenditure. The outlay for economic construction has become the leading item on the debit side of the government account. 652 659.

In making these comparisons, several observations should be noted. First, the military expenditures as listed in the records of the Communist government do not include salaries and maintenance of military personnel, which are classified as government administrative expenses. Military outlays listed in the budgets of the Nationalist Government, on the other hand, consisted mainly of such salary and maintenance payments. If the definition of military expenditure were broadened to include such outlays, and if one-half of the administrative expenses listed in the Communist budget were for the payment of military personnel and administration, then the military expenditure of the Communist government would have been tabulated here for the years 1950-52.